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Consolidating the Past and Risking the Future: Colombia’s Developmental Trajectory and 
the Prospects for a Lasting Peace in the Wake of the Havana Accord 
Rafael R. Ioris and Antonio A.R. Ioris 
 
In light of the peace accord approved in 2016 between the Colombian government and the 
FARC, this paper scrutinizes, from a historical perspective, present-day dilemmas and obstacles 
to a sustainable settlement capable of addressing the long-term developmental inequities of the 
country. One of the guiding hypotheses animating this reflection is that, as the country becomes 
more integrated in the globalized economy, the many parties involved in the conflict came to 
believe that they had more to gain with the peace than otherwise, thus paving the way to a renewed 
effort towards peace. Yet, despite its many promises, as of now, the details of the peace 
negotiations need to be seen primarily as a means to potentially boost the economy and facilitate 
the access to Colombian resources than a transformative achievement towards much-needed 
political and economic inclusion. In that regard, there are some disturbing continuities between 
the inequalities deepened during the protracted civil war and the prospects for sustained uneven 
development under the 2016 peace agreement.  
 
INTRODUCTION: SOBERING NEWS FROM A COUNTRY RAVAGED BY WAR 
On a late-night announcement on November 12th, 2016, Colombian president Juan Manuel 
Santos declared “We have reached a new final accord to end the armed conflict that integrates 
changes and propositions suggested by the most diverse sectors of society”, thus trying to assuage 
the crisis created by the ‘No’ vote that had stunned everyone in the country and around the world 
earlier in the previous month.1 The revised agreement was later in the same month endorsed by 
the national congress and, this time around, despite some criticism from ‘No’ supporters 
(particularly from the former president Alvaro Uribe), Santos did not risk putting the document 
through a second referendum where another defeat was maybe possible.2  
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It still remains to be seen how this revised agreement shall be implemented but it signals 
to the possibility of ending Latin America’s longest military conflict in modern history. To be sure, 
the rejection of the so-called Havana Accord signed between the Colombian government and the 
FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the country’s main remaining armed 
insurgent group), on the referendum of October 2nd, represented a clear sign that though essential, 
formal peace is not the only measure the country needs. Besides that, the negotiations that led to 
the peace Accord and its eventual approval by the Colombian Congress derived both from the 
willingness of both President Santos and the widespread war fatigue in Colombian society. 
In this sense, paraphrasing the title of one of Gabriel García Márquez novels, it was already 
a ‘Chronicle of a Necessary Accord Foretold’, in the sense that the government and the guerrilla 
no longer had appetite for a pointless civil war. Colombia had paid a high price for the continuation 
of a protracted conflict that for decades ravaged the national society and prevented more 
sustainable paths of economic growth in the country. Although in the last few years insurgent 
group activities decreased,3 this was not necessarily translated in many areas of the country into 
actual state rule or at least state presence.4 In fact, in many rural and more isolated regions, the 
continued threat of reverting back to a state of overt violence is still very present and many still 
find in illegal activities their main means of subsistence, often involving profitable connections 
with drug traffic dealers. Cocaine is often the only economic alternative in remote corners of the 
country and may respond for around 3% to 5% of Colombia’s GDP, thus fostering violence, 
corruption, illegality and uncertainty.5 Having said that, it is also the case that the connections 
between the civil war, drug production and economic development are not clear and the findings 
are contradictory. Some regions and sectors of the economy seem to have thrived even in the most 
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somber and violent periods of the long civil war. There are authors who argue that violence reduced 
economic activity, while others claim that it might have increased total household incomes.  
Boding additional challenges to come, the hope that a lasting peace could be quickly 
materialized and the road to some sort of social normality could emerge was left hanging in the air 
by the results of the October referendum (where the ‘no’ vote won by a very slender majority). 
Not surprisingly, domestic public opinion was deeply polarized, with the regions mostly ravaged 
by war-related activities producing some of the highest levels of support for the original Havana 
Accord, only to lose to wider, mostly urban coalitions positioned against the ceasefire agreement.6 
Moreover, the main winners were conservative politicians (under the leadership of Álvaro Uribe 
and the public prosecutor Alejandro Ordóñez), the belligerent section of the army and its associated 
military industry.7 More importantly, the difficulty of the political system to lead to a clear victory 
of the reconciliation agenda tells a great deal about the limitations and hurdles of the fragile 
Colombian democracy.  
In addition to the inability of the referendum to endorse the peace process as agreed in 
Havana, Colombia continues to face sustained socio-economic challenges, aggravated by recent 
rising levels of organized crime activity not only in the countryside but also in urban areas. These 
latest developments have not occurred in the void but rather within an already deeply unbalanced 
land tenure system that has fueled the rise and continuous operation of various guerrilla groups 
over the last 60 years.8 Throughout the country, land distribution is extremely inequitable and with 
less than 1% of the population owning more than half of Colombia’s best land; in addition, land 
tenure is notoriously insecure, especially for indigenous peoples, peasants and subsistence farmers. 
The attempts of successive governments to advance agrarian reforms were largely ineffective due 
to corruption and limited resources; in recent years, the focus shifted from land reform to 
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agribusiness-based rural development. Thus, though laudable for trying to move beyond an overly 
militaristic approach to the continued conflict in the country followed by his predecessors, 
President Santos’ political overtures will need to be complemented by continued and substantive 
negotiations, backed up by actual economic measures aimed at reintegrating local communities 
into the national economy. This seems particularly relevant today, as the country’s mainstream 
economic policies have become ever more aligned with those of free-trade agreements, such as the 
Alianza del Pacífico [Pacific Alliance] and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which are likely to 
aggravate social inequality due to the market-based priorities of such strategies.  
In light of all the manifold and potentially consequential recent developments in Colombia, 
this article examines present-day dilemmas and obstacles to a more socially inclusive and 
politically sustainable peace settlement capable of readdressing the many developmental 
shortcomings in the history of the country. The paper’s main theoretical reference is the oligarchic 
development history of Colombia and the ability of its national elites to reinvent themselves and 
reaffirm their power during both times of peace and conflict. This is directly related to the political 
economy of war protraction, as described by Richani, which is the accumulation of economic 
assets by ‘armed actors’ (including the army and political and commercial elites) who create and 
benefit from the positive political economy for war.9 In the case of Colombia, the complex set of 
benefits that the war brought to the military and the guerrilla during the 1970s and 1980s, and 
particularly in the early 1990s (largely associated with the oligarchic history of the country and 
explained by the comfortable impasse established under a low-intensity war that didn’t affect rent 
extraction) were increasingly constrained by diminishing political and economic returns after the 
emergence of the paramilitary groups in the 1990s. 
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The current piece was initially inspired on the unexpected defeat of the president’s position 
in the referendum held on October 2nd, 2016 and the hastily return to the negotiation table. 
Departing from the failed referendum, we then sought to investigate the potential courses for 
lasting peace and its associate goal of regional and national reconstruction and development. 
Moving beyond the specifics of the Havana Accord and the more directly related dynamics of 
conflict resolution (e.g. demobilization of troops and compensation of the victims), this article 
aims at reflecting, from a historical perspective, on a broader and prospective scale on how 
developmental matters may instigate Colombia’s path towards not only peace, but effective socio-
economic and political enfranchisement.   
 
COLOMBIA’S DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORY: THE LONG AND TORTUOUS 
ROAD TO (NO) PEACE 
Colombia is a country of abundant natural resources and economic potential mired by 
major contrasts between regions, peoples and economic sectors. The nation has followed an 
intensely painful path in recent decades, which combined a resilient leftist guerrilla, influential 
drug traffic activities, striking violence in urban and rural areas, and aggressive economic 
liberalism fueled by natural resource exports (oil in particular).10 Colombian historical trajectory 
has been defined by continued sharp socio-economic contrasts and the succession of fast-paced 
developmental initiatives – such as a remarkable insertion into the global economy as an important 
primary commodity exporter, starting at the end of the 19th century, as well as the significant 
levels of industrialization achieved in the middle of the 20th century – which though successful, 
have not been instrumental to ameliorate, let alone address the severe inequality that is to this day 
a defining feature of the country. As kindly pointed out by an anonymous referee, who engaged 
vigorously with the previous versions of this text, what happened in Colombia was uncommon in 
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the rest of Latin America, given that Colombia managed to maintain relative economic stability, 
largely avoiding the boom-bust and debt-crisis chaos of other countries; moreover, the ability to 
achieve this has probably depended largely on maintaining and deepening socio-political 
inequalities. 
This is a particularly disheartening reality considering that, for much of the 20th century, 
Colombia witnessed a substantial degree of economic and political experimentation and change. 
In fact, the nation witnessed fast-paced economic growth, important levels of industrial growth in 
different parts of the country, and, especially since the late 1950s, and even more so in the 1960s 
and 1970s, when the county came to be seen by most of its regional neighbors as a remarkable 
case of success of liberal democratic institutions. To be sure, given the context of dictatorial 
regimes throughout much of the region in the period, the Colombia experiences with pre-accorded 
peaceful transitions of power among the two main political parties (Liberal and Conservative), in 
the wake of the creation of the National Front in 1957, seemed warranted as a case of a functioning, 
formally liberal political system. To be sure, this was a highly undemocratic contract, taking into 
consideration it looked like a peaceful transfer of power but was actually backed up by La 
Violencia – the ten-year civil war that marred the country, particularly the countryside between 
1948 and 1958 – and thus only possible because of the threat of renewed violence. As this paper 
seeks to indicate, the Colombian experiences since at least the middle of the 20th century should 
rather be seen as those of the history of the shortcomings of formal democracy, as well as those of 
top-down attempted modernization. 
Pertaining to the political dimension, between 1958 and the late 1970s, though some 
changes were made along the way, the Colombian political system was best characterized by 
coalitional rule between Liberals and Conservatives, at times in ways that resembled the 
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experiences of consorciational regimes, though in the Colombian case, without the ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic elements.11 And although the National Front was able to put an end of the 
traumatic experiences of La Violencia, largely by creating strong incentives to the two main parties 
to accept the rules of the game; the restrictive nature of the political to all other relevant political 
forces, especially among popular sectors, was nonetheless solidified by the elitist and restrictive 
character of the power-sharing agreement put in place in 1958.  
The oligarchic nature of the Colombian state was further reinforced by a central feature of 
the historical political evolution of the country: its weak central structures of state and strong 
regional elites. It is worth noting, also, that the Colombian elite that has promoted economic 
development through a very conservative social platform (for instance, maintaining vertical 
immobility and political control) is not cohesive and united on many issues and practices its 
leadership along a complex coordination of public and private initiatives.12 In effect, like in many 
cases in other Latin American societies, Colombian regional oligarchies have managed to advance 
modernization and economic growth while having to accommodate multiple interests, characters 
and groups. Along this path, the central Colombian state has more than once proven weaker to 
promote broad levels of social reform especially vis-à-vis powerfully encroached provincial ruling 
groups.13 
Taken together, these deep-set features of the Colombian developmental trajectory would, 
in the long run, prove conducive to rising levels of dissatisfaction particularly in periods of rapid 
demographic grow, such in the postwar era. The formal shortcomings of the Colombian political 
institutions were also aggravated by the frustration of even middle-income sectors about the 
possibility of significant socio-economic reform within the formal political system. In fact, even 
when land reform was attempted in a more concerted fashion, such as during the sponsorship of 
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the Alliance for Progress in the early 1960s, when the country was chosen to be a showcase of the 
initiative, and despite the initial enthusiasm among urban middle sectors, the results of the program 
palled against the expectations of both the Colombian and US governments, and were certainly 
much less than what was needed.14,15  
Sadly, though disappointing, these experiences fits well within the history of Colombian 
land tenure and activities, where traditionally small plotters were not allowed by large landholders 
to grow coffee in their own plots as this was seen as dangerously freeing them from traditional 
economic and political rule of local bosses.16 Much in the same way, the important 
industrialization of the middle of the century was largely derivative of a cross-sectional alliance 
between traditional landowning families and regional industrialists, which rather than create a new 
social segment capable of some sort of rupture from the traditional forms of exerting political 
power, rather worked to consolidate control of the decision-making process in traditional 
oligarchic forces, thus sustaining the path of restricted access to the decision-making process, 
though industrial workers did then, and still do their best to push the boundaries of the local and 
national spheres of economic and political power.17,18 Moreover, the National Front actively 
worked through clientelistic politics and restricted legislation to more autonomous forms of 
mobilization to sustain a divided, weak and dispersed labor movement.19  
In this sense, though it may be true that the National Front proved successful in preventing 
overt military intervention in the political realm for much of the second half of the twentieth 
century, a time when much of the region was mired in co-called bureaucratic-authoritarian 
regimes. Unfortunately, this outcome seems to have been reached at the cost of excluding more 
socially advanced, progressive and even radical demands (e.g. the socialist agenda advanced by 
student and intellectuals groups) and actors being repressed. In the long run this dynamics 
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enhanced the already present political apathy of growing numbers of political and economic 
disenfranchised groups. Furthermore, the guaranteed share of state resources in all realms of 
government which assured the democratic election of four, Liberal and Conservative party 
president, between 1958 and 1970, was conducive to enhanced corruption and patronage of 
favored supporters.20.  
The second half of the twentieth century in Colombia was, in effect, marked on the one 
hand by relative economic successes, especially that of sustained economic growth and the rise of 
a domestic manufacturing industry, while, on the other hand, continued and exacerbated problems 
with internal violence and displacement of dozens of thousands of people. Especially during the 
said-to-be economic success of the late 1960s and 1970s, the country benefitted from rising 
international prices for its historically main export item: coffee. Similarly, even if impacted by the 
regional debt crisis of the early 1980s, Colombia nonetheless withstood that experience 
significantly better than most of its neighbors, at least partially due to rising prices for what has 
since become one of its key sources of revenues, namely oil exports. Moreover, notwithstanding 
the fact that the formal economy had been strengthened in the last few decades, two main negative 
sides of these dynamics have to be highlighted. First, the continued deeply uneven ways in which 
the economic growth achieved in the period benefitted the country’s population. The level of 
poverty remained significantly high between 1979 and 1991 (with a marginal reduction from 0.59 
to 0.57) and the Gini coefficient reduced only marginally between 1978 and 1988 (mainly because 
of changes in urban areas) and then stabilized between 1988 and 1995 (with deterioration of the 
Gini coefficient in the countryside).21 Secondly, the fact that an important, though not easily 
measurable element of this economic revival derived from the eve more present production and 
exportation of illegal drugs.  
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Especially relevant for today’s context, the late 1980s witnessed the rise of new scale of 
widespread violence, this time marked the presence of flaunting drug lords (e.g. Pablo Escobar), 
who controlled enormous economic resources and related political influence in the country. 
Combined, and also largely pressured by new, strengthened and mobilized social movements, 
these events pushed for the writing of a new constitution, which in many ways represented a new 
start for the country and was, appropriately, thus, shrouded in high expectations. In specific, the 
1991 constitution strengthened judicial powers, recognized the country’s cultural pluralism, 
broadened the scope of individual and political rights, and expanded municipal and regional 
autonomy. At the same time, however, clearly reflecting the persistent logic of militarism as an 
accepted means of action in Colombian politics, the document was largely silent of the about the 
status of the police and military and their relations with civil authority. To be sure, unchecked by 
the new legislators, military spending had increased five times between 1985 and 1990. The size 
of the army doubled and the national police remained under control of the Ministry of Defense.22  
Alongside these legal reforms, negotiations between the Colombian government and 
revolutionary groups have been present in the course of the brutal conflicts marking the history of 
the country. In the early 1980s, for one, President Betancur negotiated a cease-fire in 1982-1985 
aimed to grant amnesty to some guerrillas and release political prisoners, paving the way to the 
creation of the Unión Patriótica [Patriotic Union], a political arm of the FARC then. However, 
these negotiations fell apart when vast numbers of members of the Patriotic Union were 
systematically gunned down and another revolutionary group, M-19, famously seized the Supreme 
Court building in Bogota and, when the military tried to retake the premises, 11 justices and more 
than 100 people were killed.  
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New rounds of peace negotiation happened under the presidency of Pastrana Arango 
(1998-2002), but these ended abruptly with the kidnap of a congressman and other political figures 
by the guerrilla. Pastrana introduces the unpopular and controversial ‘Plan Colombia’, supported 
and financed by the USA, which was mostly aimed at stopping the drug flow (cocaine and heroin 
in particular) to the USA over the Mexican border. As a whole, the plan’s anti-drug policy proved 
ineffective in terms of decreasing production, generating economic development and, ultimately, 
reducing violence. In the last two decades, the USA government invested more than US$ 25 billion 
on international drug-control programs, but the initiative largely failed to reduce the supply of 
cocaine and heroin entering the country, while at the same time generated widespread and 
profoundly damaging consequences in Latin America.23 In the end, Plan Colombia may have 
reduced the cultivation of cocoa plants, but not cocaine processing (now estimated around 70% of 
global production), while aggravating the humanitarian crisis and forced internal displacement.24   
Within this persistent challenging scenario, in 2004, Álvaro Uribe Vélez launched the Plan 
Patriota [Patriotic Plan], also with the direct help of the USA, aimed to displace guerrilla groups, 
occupy remote areas traditionally controlled by the guerrilla and promote social programs. New 
legislation passed in 2005 had provisions for reduced punishment for both paramilitary and 
guerrilla fighters if they surrendered their arms, renounced violence and returned assets 
appropriated illegally. FARC’s response was the ‘Resistance Plan’ in the form of an offensive 
organized to counteract military action and undermine the perception that security improved with 
Uribe. Moreover, in 2006, some preliminary peace talks already took place in Cuba between the 
government and ELN but produced no concrete results. 
The situation remained unstable with a succession of political scandals involving the 
association between politicians and the paramilitary, clashes with Ecuador and Venezuela, and the 
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continuous war with FARC (with the killing of its leader, Raúl Reyes, and the release of a high-
profile hostage, Ingrid Betancourt, in 2008). FARC launches the ‘Rebirth Plan’ in 2009 that 
intensified warfare with the controversial use of landmines, snipers and bombing of urban areas; 
this plan encouraged the government to again take the offensive and clash with the guerrilla. 
Despite investments in the army’s ability to face the guerrilla, violence and dissatisfaction 
continued to be fueled in the countryside because of the increasing concentration of land ownership 
and serious levels of inequality leading to recruitment of dissatisfied individuals by guerilla 
groups.25 
In 2010, the former Secretary of Defense under Uribe, Juan Manuel Santos, was elected 
president (after the courts decided that Uribe could not run for a third term in office). In 2012, 
Santos announced that the government would engage in talks with FARC in order to explore 
alternatives to end the long conflict, learning from past mistakes and from the frustrated attempts 
that tried to resolve the issues (although such level of commitment was criticized by the former 
president Uribe as a sign of weakness and an effort to seek peace at any cost). In a climate of great 
national and international expectation, Santos announced in September 2016 the complete settling 
of the dispute between the government and the FARC and revealed the details of a comprehensive 
truth and reconciliation process. The agreement included the admissions of guilt and the 
requirement to do community service by the perpetrators of violence during the conflict. 
Although it was not a legal requirement, President Santos promised in 2015 to submit the 
Peace Accord to a public referendum in order to legitimize its targets and the mechanism of 
retributive justice. Considering the tumultuous and exclusionary history of the county, it is no 
surprise that peace negotiations have been so protracted and late-in-coming. In fact, it seems to be 
largely on the basis of the idiosyncratic place President Santos is trying to occupy in the current 
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political scenario of Colombia, vis-à-vis his predecessor and the weakened state of the FARC that 
a path  towards a lasting peace came into fruition.26 Yet, complicating things further, and to the 
surprise of the international community, as indicated, on October 2nd, most Colombians rejected 
the first version of the Accord, a clear indication that the terms of the agreement were far from 
universally accepted.  
One of the champions of the ‘No’ was Uribe, who articulated a fierce campaign against 
what his group considered a soft, accommodating plan. The former president is close tied to the 
interests of powerful groups of landowners and other conservative forces that are likely to risk 
losing economic and political ground from new plans to distribute land to former guerrilla 
members.27 Complicating things further just a few days after the frustrated outcome of the 
referendum, another unexpected development surprised the country and the international 
community: the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2016 to President Santos, even without any 
concrete solution to the conflict. The prize seems to have been a bet on the possibility of future 
peace, even though this decision was also criticized as direct interference in national, ongoing 
negotiations because it suddenly increased the popularity and the visibility of the Colombian 
president. In fact, the Norwegian Nobel Committee was the first to declare that their decision was 
to encourage “all those who are striving to achieve peace, reconciliation and justice in Colombia. 
The president himself has made it clear that he will continue to work for peace right up until his 
very last day in office. Thus the Committee hoped that the Peace Prize would give him strength to 
succeed in this demanding task. Furthermore, it is the Committee's hope that in the years to come 
the Colombian people will reap the fruits of the ongoing peace and reconciliation process.”28  
The negative result obtained in the ballot boxes did not trigger a reopening of the hostilities, 
but forced the parties involved to go back to the negotiation table. It was not clear what would 
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happen if the ‘No’ prevailed, but both the government and the FARC had already traveled a long 
way and there was a strong willingness to try to secure the anticipated peace. And though it is still 
unclear whether this peace deal, shall be indeed implemented, it will likely serve as a benchmark 
for more lasting and much needed developmental reforms in this rich and promising nation. If 
restricted to allowing the deepening of economic ties to an ever-more interdependent global 
economy, ready to invest more in the country, the Havana Accord will once again, like many 
similar plans in the past, basically mirror the oligarchic nature of Colombian politics and society 
rather than provide more inclusive paths for the future.  
 
ENDEMIC VIOLENCE AND THE FINAL OFFER OF PEACE: THE HAVANA 
ACCORD AND THE MULTIPLE PARTIES INVOLVED 
Peace negotiations between the government of Colombia and the FARC, the country’s 
main remaining armed insurgent group, started taking place in Havana, the capital of Cuba (which 
was considered by the guerrilla as a safe and reliable neutral ground), more than four years ago 
and this time, despite, many setbacks along the way, it seemed that things could come to a fruitful 
end after more than 50 years of conflict. In fact, in contrast with similar attempts in the early 1980s 
and late 1990s, this round of negotiations was seen by most, inside and outside the country, at least 
until a few days ago, as the culmination of a process of national political restructuring that could 
finally produce a very elusive and still-needed lasting peace. The process deviated from the 
conservative path, known as the Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática [Democratic 
Security Policy], put together by the Uribe administration (2002-2010), in the wake of the national 
crisis of the 1990s. Derivative mainly from the latest wave of drug-related violence, this Policy 
was mainly aimed at revamping the national economy, along a path of pro-market reforms that 
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included security adjustments,29 which is an approach that visibly maintained pro-elite, oligarchic 
rule. 
Colombia still faces many difficult socio-economic challenges today, including urban-rural 
inequalities, land concentration and modest rural development, social exclusion and a 
dysfunctional democracy, as well as the need to deal with the uncertainties of global trade and the 
depressed price of commodities (such as the market value of oil exports). To many, especially in 
the international investors’ community, as well as their domestic counterparts, these actions 
seemed to be the best way to restructure the country’s economy, especially in a time when much 
of Latin America was surfing the so-called pink wave under national-developmentalist 
administrations.30  
Interestingly, while the country since the 1990s, despite the party in power, has pushed for 
a path of market-led reforms inserting the national economy in the reigns of a regionally and 
globally more integrated commodity markets, state repression against traditional guerrilla 
insurgents were similarly deepened, particularly under the guise of Plan Colombia and the 
associated growth of paramilitary forces. Moreover, in spite of the fact that some of the latter was 
eventually curbed, largely due to international pressure, the rise in militarism and increased 
military expenditures as part of the national budget were continuous and permanent trends.31 And 
although in the last few years insurgent group activities decreased, this was not necessarily 
translated in many areas of the country into actual state rule or even presence. As already indicated 
above, in many rural and more isolated regions, the continued threat of reverting back to a state of 




Endemic violence has undoubtedly been a persistent problem and one important face of 
Colombian society throughout much of its history, not restricted to one sector or specific regions 
of the country, but rather found in both rural and urban areas. There are many different, and 
interconnected, dimensions of the same problem, such as socio-economic, political, domestic, and 
racial violence. As also indicated the modernization and industrialization of the country in the 
middle of the last century never delivered all promises and never fulfilled all expectations, at the 
same time that accelerated the disintegration of cultures and ecosystems. The government, the 
political system, the army and the judiciary were not able to maintain a functioning democratic 
state, which left space for the provision of some public services and partial social security by the 
guerrillas. What is more, though negatively impacted the huge potential of the Colombia economy, 
endemic violence does not seem to have radically prevented the expansion of specific economic 
sectors, nor completely halted the flow of foreign direct investment in the country.  
In fact, the violence perpetrated by armed groups sympathetic to the interests of the oil 
industry (e.g. public armed forces and right-wing paramilitaries) facilitated investments in the 
sector, as forced displacement and violence against civilian groups served to protect economically 
important infrastructure and secured land for oil exploration.33 Much in the same way, the central 
Colombian state could not develop, let “modernize” the country, without establishing a standard 
monopoly of violence in the territory because of a symbiotic relationship between the parties 
controlling the state and various non-state actors who exercise power in rural peripheries.34 But if 
the economy was only partially affected by the conflict, widespread violence reached disturbing 
levels. Between 1985 and 1998, the annual average rate of homicides was 1,420, with a tendency 
to grow; during this period, there were 14,000 violent incidents, including attack against 
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populations, sabotage and kidnaping; among the victims of the conflict, 27% were members of the 
civil society, 28% were army fighters and 46% were members of guerrilla groups.35 
There are increasing numbers of significantly violent crimes, including many with 
economic motivation (as in the case of kidnaping). As a result, regions mostly ravaged by war-
related activities and disputes for mineral and other natural resources, such as Choco, produced 
some of the highest levels of support for the Havana Accord in the October second referendum.36 
Other trials, some of which are probably directly related to the failed approval of the Peace Accord, 
are related to the rising levels of organized crime activity not only in the countryside but also in 
urban areas.37 Moreover, Colombia has witnessed one of the largest numbers of displaced 
populations of over 6.9 million people (only comparable with the recent Syrian and Iraq refuge 
crises), according to a United Nations report,38 and the ways to address this problem have also led 
to continued hurdles towards moving to a post-conflict situation.  
Yet, as challenging as these dynamics are, they have occurred in specific historical and 
geographical circumstances and within an already deeply unbalanced land tenure structure which 
have plagued the country’s history. In fact, now, when some form of peace and concord is looming, 
there are emerging pressures for natural resources exploitation (as in the Pacific coast and in the 
Amazon region) that are likely to benefit enormously from the pacification of the countryside and 
from the pursuit of pro-market institutional reforms. In fact, though laudable for trying to move 
beyond an overly militaristic approach to the structural lines of the continued conflict in the 
country followed by his predecessor, Santos’ political overtures are largely aimed at integrating 
many communities into the national economy, particularly in times when Colombia’s mainstream 
economic policies have become ever more aligned with those of free-trade agreements, such as the 
aforementioned Trans-Pacific Partnership.39  
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To be sure, land reform and the creation of restrictions on foreign involvement in key 
industries, such a mining and oil exploration, were some of the main demands the negotiators from 
the FARC presented repeatedly to the government in order to suspend activities. In fact, the 
growing acceptance of the Santos’ administration of the land reform claim has been seen as one of 
the most promising aspects of the peace negotiations.40 Formal peace shall likely attract and 
facilitate the operation of foreign companies interested in Colombia’s abundant resources (one of 
the new frontiers is exactly the Pacific coast, in the Department of Choco, formally recognized by 
the British Embassy in Bogota as an opportunity for UK miners and timber millers), and that, 
disguised behind the elegant rhetoric of the peace treaty and the emphasis on ‘integral rural 
development’ and respect to local socio-culture, much-needed elements for effective development 
shall unfortunately only vaguely be pursued – should the commitments made in the Havana Accord 
be any indication of what is to come. 
The importance of the agrarian question is not surprising in a country ravaged by land-
tenure related historical conflicts and even when an assertive land reform program was sought, 
such as in the 1960s, little was done to curb countryside violence which, over the last 60 year has 
cost the staggering amount of about 220,000 deaths, mostly of poor rural residents.41 In fact, even 
though land titling was conducted in many parts of the country, in different times in the last 70 
years, it was implemented piecewise and incompletely, blocked in most areas by politically 
powerful large landholders, creating widespread levels of insurgent activity.42 Colombia remains 
one of the most unequal countries in the word, with a Gini index of 0.535 (higher in the 
countryside), low levels of investment in social programs and growing concentration of income in 
the hands of the richest 1% of the population between 1993 and 2014.43  
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In order to fulfill its potential for peace, land reform has to be conducted in a consistent, 
democratic, and significant scale, something that continues to pose serious political challenges in 
a country where conducting legal political or even labor related mobilization is regularly 
something that present a real risk of death. At the same time, it is important to understand the 
complexity and the uniqueness of contemporary social and economic circumstances. The national 
economy relies on the exports of a small number of primary good and commodities (oil, coffee, 
bananas, etc.) whilst the Colombian population is increasingly urbanized (note that family farmers 
[campesinos] represent now only 12% of the population, according to Montañez-Gómez.44 It is 
also crucially important to realize the broad range of disputes and the deeply politicized 
interactions involved in the armed conflict now that peace seems an actually viable prospect. 
The focus on globalization and market-based solutions by the liberal Colombian 
administrations over the last two decades, as much as the close alliance with North America that 
contrasts with the path taken by most neighboring countries, has done little to improve 
infrastructure, literacy rates and openness to trade, as analyzed by González.45 As already 
indicated, though negatively impacted, the long conflict did not prevent the expansion and the 
profitability of many economic sectors, especially because the country’s capitalism has been an 
intrinsically violent experience that both produced poverty and led to selective capital circulation 
and accumulation.46 The sustained violence facilitated the transformation of the subsistence 
economy as it promoted violent land grabbing and the expansion of commercial agriculture.47 With 
the former FARC fighters in parliament and integrated in the wider economy, and with Santos 
legitimized as a charismatic and effective leader, it is likely that it will be easier to approve a 
package of liberalizing measures and demonstrate to the rest of the planet that Colombia is ‘open 
for business’. But even though it was possible for some sectors to thrive during the civil war years, 
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there continues to be huge risks and significant transaction costs involved. In this sense, the current 
prospects of the negotiation may signal towards a potentially conclusive settlement, capable of 
reducing the humanitarian costs involved in this protracted civil war, as well as facilitating access 
to Colombian natural resources. Yet, for a durable and in fact transformative peace to be achieved, 
further challenges remain.  
 
THE PROSPECTS FOR A LASTING PEACE: THE ABSENCE OF MUCH-NEEDED 
DEVELOPMENTAL TRANSFORMATIONS 
The referendum of October 2nd was an unnecessary and poorly conducted course of action 
aimed at buttressing popular legitimacy of the decisions set in motion by the Santos administration. 
And regardless if one still believes that the majority of Colombians are on the ‘side of peace’ – 
given that key areas of country had a historical low turn due to a hurricane passing the Caribbean 
coast and that Uribe’s ‘No’ campaign was largely conducted on the tactics of fear – the point 
remains that a new way forward has to be (quickly!) found by both side of the agreement should 
lasting peace be found. As discussed above, a key question that will become gradually more 
apparent is the fact that, as much as the war, the peace will benefit some sectors and groups much 
more than others. During the belligerent period – the ‘war system’ from the1970s to the 1990s, as 
superbly described by Richani – there was a tacit, even comfortable, arrangement between the 
guerrillas and the national state which allowed both sides to extract rent behind the scenes of a 
low-intensity war activity.48 With the intervention of paramilitaries in the second part of the 1990s, 
the situation became less stable and it was increasingly more difficult to maintain the status quo. 
Some form of change was demanded by almost all parties involved, leading to a serious national 
debate and the eventual approval of the Havana Accord. In that sense, and despite all the rhetoric, 
there were many reasons for the peace agenda, but probably the attempt to maintain the overall 
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balance of politico-economic power was the main one. Crucially, to be on the ‘side of peace’ 
meant, in practice, to be on the side of a certain type of socio-economic agenda that depends and 
is likely to flourish from the peace agreement that was possible to sign. 
Interestingly, if one considers that about two-thirds of eligible voters abstained from 
participating in the 2016 referendum, most Colombian did not agree with the terms of the 
agreement or did not feel encouraged to participate in the process. One thus needs to go beyond 
the specifics of the agreement on the ballot to understand the structural reasons behind this wide 
sense of frustration. In that regard, the notion of socio-economic violence could be seen as a useful 
tool to understand the remaking of the Colombia society, a nation defined by population 
displacement and continued governmental practices that for many eroded the minimal conditions 
for continued social existence (e.g. forced displacement, economic insecurity and structural lack 
of opportunities). That is related to the highly influential ideas of Galtung, who proposed the notion 
of structural violence to capture the reality of lasting socio-economic and political factors 
preventing specific social segments from accessing goods needed to meet their basic needs, while 
benefiting unevenly others in the process.49 It is clear, therefore, that the peace in Colombia 
requires substantial and enduring changes in politico-economic processes, democratic institutions 
and rule of law in order to overcome the structural violence behind the historical conflicts 
destroying national society. 
A viable agenda for lasting, transformational peace needs to include, in addition to 
cessation of conflict, significantly different basis of development. In other words, development as 
conceived and promoted by multiple players since the post-World War II period has coexisted and 
even benefited from the belligerent situation. Novel dimensions of development need to include 
key elements of social justice understood as the reforming of the institutional conditions that 
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sustain and reproduce poverty and inequality, including moving away from the historical, and more 
recently deepened, path of insertion into the global economy by means of commodity export, 
especially in the field of carbon-based energy production. In fact, it needs only to be remembered 
that much of the end of violence sought under Uribe’s Democratic Security Policy was aimed most 
of all to create a more welcoming environment for foreign investors rather than actually addressing 
the deep-rooted causes of the continued conflicts in the country.50  
Concrete measures should involve some form of national pact for peace, if needed, by 
means of a mini constituent assembly able to involve and thus place responsibility of other political 
actors in the process. Similarly, the Santos administration needs to make a much better case for 
the value of any type of Transitional Justice, including the political incorporation of former 
guerrillas, along with their monitored military demobilization, for a successful path towards peace. 
Similarly, effective and peaceful integration of FARC into the political arena has to be paved by 
concrete means to prevent that the debacle of the Patriotic Union of the mid-1980s, when more 
than 3000 former members of the guerrillas who had joined the political process were murdered 
with total impunity assured by the omission of the state apparatus.51 
Though essential, these are not however sufficient elements of a lasting peace understood 
not only as the absence of overt violence. To be sure, effective representation of most affected 
communities in the violence of insurgency actions and especially those more in need of land needs 
to be a central element of the any new move towards a sustainable peace, so that the errors of the 
past, when the National Peasant Association, though formally allowed to exist, was consistently 
undermined by conservatives administration in the 1970s,52 as well as the market-led land policies 
of the 1990s, which benefitted most the already capitalized, larger landholders.53 Moreover, though 
perhaps even more challenging, the formalization of a peace accord needs to be seen as only the 
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first step towards an effective path of reforms capable of addressing the root causes that gave rise 
to such a devastating and destructive era in Colombian history.  
As it stands, the peace accords may create new opportunities for trade with China and 
access to areas that were once inaccessible due to guerrilla activity, considering that so far the free-
market economy – with a government close to Washington – has attracted little Chinese attention 
and this has been comparable with the investment made in the much smaller Ecuadorian market.54 
However, much more is required to over the low quality of the ‘actually existing democracy’, the 
ineffective national state and the reliance on natural resources exports, including oil, coal, nickel 
and gold.55 
It should be clear, therefore, that, in the short term, the Santos administration needs to prove 
capable of preventing the derailment of the commitments made by both sides in the Havana 
Accord, largely by steering things away from the rising right-wing rhetoric of his right-wing 
predecessor. Much in the same way, though the slowdown in the global demands for much of 
Colombia’s exports in the recent years posed added challenges to consolidating an effective path 
toward peace, an agenda along more inclusive lines of national development needs to be pursued, 
especially by means of effective political and economic incorporation of the most traditionally 
excluded social segments, particularly in the countryside. 
Moreover, these actions must be coupled by a clear rejection of the continued path of neo-
liberal integration of the country in the recent wave of economic trends; something that is likely 
to be halted by recent political events in the United States, anyway. Finally, and tragically so, 
considering the long tradition of Colombian politics and also the ongoing ‘conservative turn’ in 
the region and around the world, it is somewhat likely that the promise of peace will soon be 
undermined by growing tensions and micro-scale wars difficult to appease. Colombia has to 
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effectively overcome its painful history in order to gain its future. This is a national experience of 
great regional and international relevance, which needs to be carefully and closely followed, 
especially because the specific architecture of the peace has direct consequences for how political 
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